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Throughout the history of National Insurance in the UK, there has been relatively little 
emphasis on benefit conditions or sanctions (previously called disqualifications). The 
relevant academic literature has been correspondingly thin. But over the past three decades 
there has been a dramatic shift to increased conditionality in social security, accompanied by 
increased harshness in the penalties. This has started to spawn a substantial new literature. 
This review article considers three significant recent publications. Although written from 
different perspectives, they all conclude that the current UK sanctions system cannot be 
justified. The review article argues that more attention needs to be paid to the flaws in the 
economic case for conditionality. It concludes that effective reform of the system depends on 
a reassertion of the concepts of social citizenship which underlay the development of 




It is often said that the UK National Insurance system has always had conditionality and 
associated benefit sanctions. But although strictly true, this is misleading. For most of the 
time since its start in 1913 the system has had comparatively little emphasis on benefit 
conditions or on sanctions (previously called disqualifications) for breaching them. Such 
conditions as there were, arose from insurance principles. There was a notorious campaign in 
the later 1920s to enforce a requirement on the unemployed to be ‘genuinely seeking work’, 
but after an outcry, an official inquiry and a Labour Party backbench revolt, the requirement 
was abolished in 1930. Thereafter there were not many disqualifications – typically a few 
tens of thousands per year - except for giving up a job voluntarily or being sacked without a 
good reason. The latter meant a delay to the start of benefit, typically of 4 weeks, on top of 




The lack of emphasis on conditionality reflected the public attitudes of the time; in 1937 
Clement Attlee could write ‘I can well remember the time when it was assumed that everyone 
unemployed, was so through his own fault....to-day unemployment is realised to be in the 
majority of cases a misfortune due to the maladjustment of the economic machine instead of 
a failure of character......’. The dominance of Keynesianism after 1945, and the actuality of 
full employment until the 1970s, ensured that there was rarely any political focus on 
conditionality and that the exceptions, such as the Wilson government’s ‘four week rule’ 
(1968) affected only relatively small numbers of people (Meacher, 1974). But over the past 
three decades, in the UK and across the developed world, there has been a dramatic shift to 
increased conditionality, accompanied by increased harshness in the penalties. This has been 
linked to a decline in commitment to social insurance as a collective protection against loss of 
income caused by unemployment or sickness, and a rise in the belief that social security (now 
increasingly called ‘welfare’) should be used as a means of coercion for unemployed or 
workless people who are thought to need to be ‘activated’. Along with these changes has 
gone a hardening of public attitudes towards the unemployed. 
 
In the case of the UK, the process began under the Thatcher government in 1986 with the 
introduction of Restart interviews and an increase in the maximum length of an 
unemployment benefit disqualification from 6 to 13 weeks. It continued under the 
Conservatives with further lengthening of the maximum penalty to 26 weeks; reintroduction 
of detailed job search requirements (‘actively seeking employment’); replacement for 
disqualified claimants of the previous entitlement to reduced Supplementary Benefits on the 
normal criteria by discretionary ‘hardship payments’, harshly assessed; introduction of a 2 
week wait before even these reduced payments could be claimed; use (from 1994) of 
administrative targets for referrals for disqualification or sanction; and introduction of 
Jobseekers’ Agreements. The Labour Party fought these innovations in opposition. But in 
office from 1997 it not only kept all of them, but after scrapping independent adjudication on 
sanction/disqualification referrals through the Social Security Act 1998 (which had already 
been drafted by the Conservatives), it went on to increase job search requirements, extend 
work-focused interviews to all claimants, expand conditionality and sanctions to cover sick 
and disabled people and lone parents of school age children, and increase the effective length 
of the sanctions for a missed interview from a few days to two weeks. Blairite rhetoric on 
‘rights and responsibilities’ also seriously undermined the insurance principle, by promoting 
the idea that benefits are a gift from taxpayers to claimants, rather than an entitlement which 
people pay for when they are in work (Hills, 2015). 
 
The system reached its peak severity under the Cameron governments, with yet further 
increased job search requirements; the maximum length of sanction increased to 3 years; 
repeat sanctions made to run consecutively rather than concurrently; ‘hardship payments’ 
made repayable; sick or disabled claimants losing the whole of their personal allowance 
rather than the lesser ‘work-related activity’ component of their benefit; job search and 
preparation requirements extended to lone parents with below school age children; and 
introduction of ‘workfare’. Claimants’ access to a Tribunal to challenge sanctions was also 
drastically reduced through the system of ‘mandatory reconsideration’, and the official 
language was altered to increase the stigmatisation of claimants. This was done through use 
of words such as ‘failure’, ‘transgression’ and ‘offence’, and also through abolition of the 
distinction which previously existed between ‘entitlement’ decisions, i.e. whether a claimant 
fulfilled insurance conditions, and ‘sanctions’, i.e. penalties for not meeting behavioural 
requirements subsequent to making a claim, such as attending an interview or training course 




Even this recital of changes to the rules (which is not exhaustive) does not tell the whole 
story, because the actual scale of sanctioning is obviously critical. The shift of the official 
statistics from paper to digital in 2000 has made it difficult to track the growing scale of 
sanctions back to 1986 and earlier, but at the cost of some effort it can be done (Webster, 
2018). Up to the 1990s only a few tens of thousands of unemployment benefit 
disqualifications per year were for breaches of behavioural requirements (‘active’ 
conditions). Most were for ‘voluntary leaving’ or ‘losing a job through misconduct’. But 
from the late 1980s onwards, sanctions/disqualifications in relation to ‘active’ conditions 
escalated dramatically. From under 3 per cent of claimants per quarter during the later 1980s, 
they rose to a typical 5 per cent under New Labour, reaching almost 10 per cent following a 
sanctions drive under John Hutton from 2006 onwards, and then rising further under the 
Coalition to reach a peak of 21 per cent in 2013. One quarter (24 per cent) of all those who 
claimed Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) over the six years 2010 to 2015 were sanctioned 
(National Audit Office (NAO) 2016). On reasonable assumptions, this was the highest rate of 
benefit withdrawal for breach of conditions in the history of UK unemployment insurance. 
Sanctions on sick or disabled claimants in the Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) 
‘Work Related Activity Group’ only began in October 2008, but they too saw a surge under 
the Coalition, related to non-performance of ‘work related activity’. Sanctions on claimants 
of JSA and ESA have since fallen, but the very inadequate statistics so far published by the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) suggest that sanction rates on claimants of the 
new Universal Credit (UC) are similar to the highest levels seen under JSA (Webster, 2019). 
 
Because benefit conditionality was seen as a relatively minor issue for so long, the academic 
literature relating to it has been correspondingly thin. The ‘genuinely seeking work’ episode 
of the 1920s inspired Alan Deacon’s classic study (1976), which was able to present it as an 
aberration – an exercise in irrational policy making which at that time appeared unlikely to be 
repeated. The Conservatives’ introduction of the closely similar ‘actively seeking 
employment’ requirement in 1989 aroused widespread fears and prompted the Nuffield 
Foundation to fund Bryson and Jacobs’ detailed study (1992) of the working of the system as 
it stood in 1990-91. There was a minor upsurge of debate in 1996-97 around the Labour 
Party’s announced intention to use sanctions in its ‘New Deals’, and the subsequent Labour 
government itself went on to commission studies by Paul Gregg and David Freud and by 
Gordon Waddell and Mansel Aylward. But the intensity of the 2010-15 sanctions drive and 
the severity of its impacts have started to spawn a substantial new literature, with seven 
official inquiries since 2013 and a large volume of reports from the voluntary sector as well 
as a number of academic journal articles. Michael Adler’s new book however, which this 
reviewer had the opportunity to read and comment on in the first as well as the published 
draft, is the most comprehensive study to appear to date. 
 
While the punitive sanctions regime was being built up, from 1986 to 2012, discussion was 
dominated by supporters of sanctions, largely those coming at the issue from an economist’s 
standpoint.  Sanctions advocates such as Richard Layard (a major influence on the New 
Labour approach), Paul Gregg, David Freud, Matthew Oakley and the OECD had little 
interest in the implications of conditionality for human or citizenship rights, or the rule of 
law. None of them seems to have given any thought to the problems involved in running what 
is in effect a huge, secret parallel penal system which, as Adler points out, at its peak in 2013 
was levying more fines than the mainstream justice system (and, as a matter of fact, on a 
more severe scale). They do not seem to have wondered how far the state is entitled to go in 
substituting its judgment for that of the citizen, nor do they seem to have imagined that there 
4 
 
could possibly be abuse of the invasive powers that they urged the state to take on. With their 
commitment to ‘active labour market policy’ or ‘welfare to work’, their focus was narrowly 
on the question whether sanctions would get people into employment. Any administrative 
issues arising could safely be left to the civil service to deal with, and unwanted side effects, 
if there were any, would be for others to sort out.  
 
The catalogue of administrative negligence and incompetence revealed by the Oakley report 
(2014) and the many reports of abuse from the voluntary sector gave the lie to this 
complacent outlook, and Adler’s book now provides a systematic critique of the assumptions 
behind it. A veteran researcher on administrative justice with an extensive knowledge of the 
relevant literature, Adler takes up a clear position from the outset on the disastrous 
implications of benefit sanctions for human rights.  His underlying premise is that ‘human 
rights include the right to a social minimum, i.e. to possess the basic necessities of life that 
enable people to live autonomous lives and maintain their self-respect’. The current UK 
sanctions regime breaches this right. 
 
The book is rigorously empirical in its approach. It takes the reader through the main changes 
in policy since the mid-1990s, deploying the useful device of comparing snapshots of the 
conditionality regime as it was before 1998 and as it is post-2012, thus avoiding getting 
bogged down in the intricacies of policy development. It also charts the changes in the scale 
of sanctions from 2001 to 2016, and in the main reasons for their imposition. Latterly these 
have been ‘not actively seeking employment’, non-participation in a training or employment 
scheme, and missing an interview. (In practice these are all misnomers: ‘not actively seeking 
work’ usually only means not doing precisely what is demanded by the Jobcentre, non-
participation in a scheme means missing a single session, and missing an interview often 
means just being late.) For evidence on the adverse impacts of sanctions Adler is able to draw 
on case histories compiled by the Dundee-based Scottish Unemployed Workers Network, and 
on the work of the NAO and of an Oxford University Sociology Department team (Loopstra 
et al., 2015). The NAO found that while JSA sanctions do make claimants more likely to 
enter employment, they also drive many people off benefit but not into work, and are likely 
also to push them into lower paid jobs than they would otherwise have got. The move off 
benefits but not into work had previously been found by Manning (2009), and job worsening, 
in terms of both pay and quality, by Petrongolo (2009), Arni et al. (2012) and Van Den Berg 
and Vikstrom (2014). The NAO also found that sanctions make ESA claimants less likely to 
get into work. Loopstra and her team found that for each 100 sanction decisions only 7.4 
claimants moved off benefit and into work in the next three months. Meanwhile a Rowntree-
sponsored study (Fitzpatrick et al., 2016) found that 30 per cent of destitute people had been 
sanctioned. A raft of other adverse consequences have been reported, including worsened 
health, hunger and resort to food banks, relationship breakdown, debt, homelessness and 
survival crime; the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee has recently 
embarked on an inquiry into ‘survival sex’ in which it identifies sanctions as one of the 
potential drivers of prostitution. ‘Hardship payments’ do not prevent these effects and under 
Universal Credit, because they become repayable, will help even less. 
 
The distinctive contribution of Adler’s book is the assessment of the sanctions regime in the 
light of the literature on administrative justice, the rule of law and human rights. He points 
out that the administration of sanctions has shifted away from a juridical model, which 
emphasises rights, legality and independence of decision-making, towards a bureaucratic and 
market-oriented model. Unlike court fines, benefit sanctions are imposed before any hearing; 
they take immediate effect, i.e. no time is allowed to pay; they do not take account of the 
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penalised person’s circumstances; they are disproportionate to the seriousness of the 
‘offence’; and they often apply for extended periods. These points and an evaluation against 
the principles set out by the former Lord Chief Justice Tom Bingham lead Adler to conclude 
that the sanctions regime is not compatible with the rule of law.  
 
However Adler also shows how depressingly weak the law has in practice been in defending 
claimants’ rights. The applicability of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) relating to ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ has never been 
tested in the courts. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Article 9 on the right to social security and Article 11 on the right to an adequate standard of 
living) and the European Social Charter (ESC) (Article 13 (1) on the right to adequate 
assistance) also provide potential defences against the excesses of the sanctions regime. But 
although the European Committee on Social Rights (the supervisory body for the ESC) has 
ruled that sanctions should ‘not deprive the person concerned of his/her means of 
subsistence’, in practice these provisions cannot be enforced because the UK Parliament, in 
contrast to the position on the ECHR,  has not chosen to make them justiciable. The same 
applies to the UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, in spite of the 
Special Rapporteur’s strenuous criticisms issued at the end of his visit to the UK last 
November (UN, 2018). 
 
The Welfare Conditionality Project was an ESRC-funded collaboration between six UK 
universities, which ran between 2014 and 2019. The book on Welfare Conditionality by Beth 
Watts and Suzanne Fitzpatrick started life as the literature review undertaken for the project, 
and it gives what many people will find is an indispensable account of the concepts, methods 
and impacts of conditionality, and its theoretical justifications, within a very systematic 
framework. Its scope is wider than Adler’s, with some consideration of the use of 
conditionality in health, education and housing services as well as social security, and it is 
more international. On the other hand, it does not have any descriptive material about the 
actual UK legal framework, incidence of sanctions or reasons for them, or individual case 
histories, and it does not discuss the administrative procedures or appeal processes. While 
also concerned with the ethics of sanctions, it takes a very much more neutral approach than 
Adler. In this account, Adler’s ‘rights’-based perspective is just one of six possible ethical 
standpoints, the others being utilitarianism (‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’), 
contractualism (‘rights bring responsibilities’), communitarianism (a collectivist version of 
contractualism, influential in the Blairite ‘third way’), paternalism (‘we know what is good 
for you’) and social justice (‘who deserves what?’).  However, it is striking that Watts and 
Fitzpatrick nevertheless end up in very much the same place as Adler. Having set out the 
possible ethical criteria, they construct an admirably logical framework for assessing whether 
existing forms of conditionality can be justified, and reach a very clear conclusion: ‘the 
recent intensification of sanctions-backed conditionality in UK out-of-work benefits, far less 
the much longer-standing and extraordinarily harsh regime in some parts of the US, are a 
very long distance from meeting the systematic tests’.  
 
There has not been a comprehensive empirical study of the impact of benefit sanctions since 
Peters and Joyce (2006 – fieldwork 2005), which related to the less harsh pre-2012 regime 
and itself almost certainly gave too rosy a view because the one-third of the sample selected 
from address records that the researchers failed to contact will have included a 
disproportionate number of the most disadvantaged claimants, for instance homeless people. 
DWP is still resisting the idea of any comprehensive study of the post-2012 regime, in spite 
of repeated calls by the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Public Accounts 
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Committees. Definitive empirical studies of the UK sanctions system require access to the 
data on individual claimants held by the DWP. But DWP has so far agreed to grant external 
access only to the University of Glasgow, for a yet-to-be-conducted study of the health 
impacts of sanctions. The NAO alone has been able to avoid this restriction, because of its 
special powers. All other researchers have had to use less satisfactory data. The Oxford 
University team, for instance, have conducted several studies using aggregate data for local 
authority areas, and this has produced striking results, though not fully conclusive because of 
the potential problem of ‘ecological fallacy’. Others have had to use self-selected samples 
obtained via the internet, or purposive samples obtained by standing outside Jobcentres or 
visiting service providers such as foodbanks or homeless shelters and recruiting people with 
the desired characteristics. 
 
The empirical research within the Welfare Conditionality project, reported in its Final 
Findings Report, falls into this latter category, although it does have the particular advantage, 
unlike others on this topic, of being a longitudinal study, with a sample of 481 people who 
were each interviewed three times where possible, at intervals of a year (339 had a second 
interview and 262 all three). The longitudinal design meant that the effects of conditionality 
on behaviour, particularly as perceived by the claimants, could be tracked over time. Using a 
purposive sample also had the advantage that it could be chosen to include representation 
from each of the main claimant groups of interest – jobseekers, lone parents, disabled people, 
homeless people, social tenants, families subject to anti-social behaviour orders or family 
intervention projects, offenders, migrants and Universal Credit claimants. The timing was 
fortunate in that the fieldwork took place between 2014 and 2017, thus catching the later part 
of the surge in sanctions promoted by the Coalition government.  The survey was 
supplemented by interviews with policy stakeholders and focus groups with frontline welfare 
practitioners, although DWP vetoed the participation of Jobcentre and Work Programme 
staff. 
 
The Final Findings Report provides the concrete evidence which is missing from the Watts 
and Fitzpatrick book. Its conclusions are similarly emphatic. While it does note some 
counterexamples, it finds that ‘Benefit sanctions were ineffective in moving people nearer or 
into paid employment. They were routinely experienced as punitive and more likely to 
undermine the likelihood of engagement or advancement in paid work. In certain cases the 
experience of a benefit sanction led to individuals disengaging from the social security 
system.... It was extremely rare..... for a respondent to report that.....  a sanction helped trigger 
a movement into paid work..... The most commonly held view was that the balance between 
sanctions and support was out of kilter.’ 
 
Adler and the Welfare Conditionality project authors together effectively destroy the case for 
the current UK conditionality regime, but they do not tackle the economic assumptions 
behind the drive to benefit sanctions. While there have been dissident voices within the 
profession, it is mainly economists who have promoted the drive to conditionality, on the 
basis of what are really quite simple-minded assumptions. The typical economic journal 
article on benefit sanctions takes a sample of unemployed people at a point in time and 
analyses whether sanctions increase the proportion in employment, or reduce the proportion 
on benefit, at some subsequent date. If the desired effect is found, then it is concluded, with 





First of all is the question whether there is really a significant problem at all to which 
sanctions might be a solution. Demand for labour in the economy goes up and down. When 
labour demand falls as in the major recessions starting in 1979, 1990 and 2008, there is bound 
to be a rise in unemployment. But the additional benefit claimants are people who are used to 
being in work. Why should it be thought that they need ‘activation’? In the 1980s and 1990s a 
group of British economists, supported by the OECD, constructed a theory of ‘state-
dependence’ or ‘hysteresis’ which held that being unemployed itself makes people less 
‘employable’, by sapping their motivation and degrading their skills. This was supported by 
the observation that in the recovery from a recession, the proportion of unemployment which 
is long term is higher than in the approach to it. This reasoning was undoubtedly a major 
factor driving increased conditionality at that time. However, it turned out that the whole 
theoretical edifice had been erected on the basis of a failure to perceive that long-term 
unemployment always lags short-term unemployment – by around 9 months if long-term is 
defined as over a year – at all stages of the economic cycle (Webster, 2005). More 
unemployment means more long-term unemployment. But this is not a separate problem 
requiring ‘activation’ programmes.  
 
There has also been a reluctance among many economists, and in government, to accept that 
deindustrialisation has produced areas where there is a persistent lack of demand for labour. 
It has been assumed that migration or commuting ought to resolve any localised problem. 
Therefore concentrations of unemployment must be due to the attitudes or behaviour of the 
unemployed – producing, once again, a rationale for ‘activation’ as well as for the virtual 
abandonment of regional policy. The acute awareness of the ‘left behind’ produced by the 
shock of the Brexit referendum has undermined this belief, but it has undoubtedly played a 
big role in the promotion of conditionality over the last three decades.  
 
In the pro-sanctions literature there is a general assumption that more job search is better than 
less job search, and that unemployed people need to be pushed into doing more. But job 
search has costs to the jobseeker, in terms of time, stress, phone charges, transport, paper, 
postage and loss of opportunity to save money by doing things that would otherwise need to 
be paid for. It also imposes costs on employers: they have to consider more applicants, who 
are more likely to be unsuited or unmotivated for their vacancies. The most recent official 
study of job search (McKay et al., 1999) found that for almost two-fifths of JSA claimants, 
the amount of search was limited by costs (such as fares and phone charges) and for one 
quarter, by other factors, such as sickness or unavailability of transport. Despite this, it also 
found that  the average JSA claimant spent 7 hours per week looking for work. Moreover 
many studies have shown that the most common way that lower skilled workers find jobs is 
through word of mouth; state jobseeking requirements do not recognise this route as it cannot 
easily be documented. Patacchini and Zenou (2006) found that left to themselves, people 
search more when labour demand and incomes are higher. This makes sense, as the returns to 
search will then be greater. Chetty (2008) found that people with greater financial resources 
take longer to find a job, indicating that choosiness pays off.  These findings confirm the 
rationality of jobseekers’ own decisions. British employers have been rather quiet on the 
subject, but the chief executive of the Council of Small Business of Australia recently said 
that the requirement for unemployed jobseekers to send out 20 job applications a month was 
particularly hated by business (Guardian 8/1/2019). All of this evidence strongly suggests 
that jobseekers typically choose something like the optimal amount of job search for 




Perhaps the most important question is the quality of the match between the job and the 
jobseeker. The central function of the state employment service in its original Beveridgean 
conception was to improve the flow of information about jobs to jobseekers and about 
jobseekers to employers. This can only improve the matches that are made. But introduction 
of compulsion changes the position completely. It must result in people accepting jobs which 
they would otherwise not have done, thus losing the opportunity of a better match later on. 
Forcing square pegs into round holes is bad for the jobseeker, as Petrongolo, Arni et al. and 
Van Den Berg and Vikstrom showed, in lowering their earnings and destroying their human 
capital. It is bad for the employer, who gets a less motivated worker. And it is bad for the 
economy. 
 
It has become increasingly clear that the UK is suffering from a serious crisis of low 
productivity growth. Output per hour grew by 2.2 per cent per year between 2000 and 2007, 
but since 2010 only by 0.5 per cent per year (Giles, 2019). Benefit conditionality will not be 
by any means the only cause, but it is also obvious that pushing people into low wage jobs 
which they are not good at and/or do not want to do is going to reduce productivity, as is 
undermining people’s health and wellbeing. Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) found that by 
encouraging workers to seek higher productivity jobs, and encouraging firms to create those 
jobs, unemployment insurance increases output and productivity. Benefit sanctions 
undermine this benign role. Because of the high turnover of unemployed claimants – 8.2m 
people claimed JSA at some time between 2010 and 2015, even though total unemployed 
claimants never exceeded 1.6m – the effect on the economy is potentially large. 
 
Making training compulsory is also highly problematic. Of course it is undoubtedly true that 
many unemployed, sick or disabled people need support in overcoming barriers to finding a 
job. But there is no evidence that making these employment services compulsory actually 
improves their effectiveness. In any other area of life it would be taken as axiomatic that a 
consumer compelled to take a product will get a worse one, while few people would dispute 
that the commitment that comes from voluntary choice is vital to the process of learning. 
Reports from claimants – including those in the Welfare Conditionality sample – regularly 
comment on the inadequacy or inappropriateness of compulsory training. In any case under 
the current regime the UK provides little in the form of substantive training. Most of it is 
simply focused on writing C.V.s and on the process of job application. The Social Mobility 
Commission recently reported (2019) that as a proportion of GDP, public expenditure on 
training in Great Britain was among the lowest of the G7 countries between 2004-2011 (the 
latest figures available), with only Japan at comparably low levels; spending in France was 
some 30 times higher. They also found that disadvantaged adults with the lowest 
qualifications are the least likely to access adult training despite being the group who would 
benefit most. 
 
In relation to workless people with disabilities or health issues, UK policy in the past two 
decades has been driven by the assumption that the main issue has been about claimants’ 
attitudes and behaviour. The Blair government promoted the ‘biopsychosocial model’ of 
Waddell and Aylward (2005) in furtherance of this belief. But it is striking how the economic 
literature has largely ignored the obvious fact that under the neoliberal order employers have 
become much less tolerant of sickness absences or limited capabilities among their staff. 
There has been little research on this. But the government-funded Skills and Employment 
Survey 2017 (Green et al., 2018) reported that Britons are under more pressure at work now 
than at any time over the past 25 years. Almost a third of respondents said they had to work at 
very high speeds ‘all’ or ‘almost all’ of the time. More than 45 per cent said the same for the 
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requirement to work very hard and meet tight deadlines. These metrics were substantially 
higher than in 1992. About 55 per cent of women and 47 per cent of men said they ‘always’ 
or ‘often’ went home from work exhausted. The proportion of people who have a lot of 
discretion over how they do their jobs has declined massively, from 62 per cent in 1992 to 38 
per cent in 2017. Baumberg (2014) did not look directly at the question of employers’ 
tolerance of staff disabilities, but he was able to show that people in low-control jobs are 
more likely to claim incapacity benefits in the following year, and concluded that 
‘deteriorating job control seems to be a part of the explanation for rising incapacity, and ..... 
high levels of incapacity should be seen as partly a result of the changing nature of work’. 
The implication is not only that sanctions address the wrong problem where sick or disabled 
people are concerned, but also that they will have contributed to worsening health through 
encouraging employers to offer bad conditions.  
 
All of these considerations confirm how weak is the rationale for the current benefit sanctions 
regime even in its own terms. But in contrast to the labour market economists and ‘welfare to 
work’ advocates, Adler and Watts and Fitzgerald rightly insist that welfare conditionality 
raises more than technical questions about the costs and benefits of labour market policies. At 
the heart of the issues lie questions about values and philosophy. Conditionality and sanctions 
are essentially based on an assumption that unemployed people are not full citizens suffering 
a temporary misfortune, but are a different and lesser kind of person who does not deserve to 
be treated the way the rest of us expect to be treated. Their situation is their own fault; they 
are takers, not givers; shirkers, not workers; they do not know what is good for them, but 
need to be told by the state; they do not respond to suggestions made reasonably, so they 
must be compelled to do so. These beliefs can be shown to be false, but they are not just 
about facts; they stem from a lack of commitment to equality and social inclusiveness. It is no 
coincidence that the rise of sanctions has gone step by step with the rise of the neoliberal 
order. Effective reform of the system therefore depends on a reassertion of the concepts of 
social citizenship that underlay the development of National Insurance in the twentieth 
century, and on securing their renewed acceptance by a large enough section of the 










Acemoglu D and Shimer R (2000) ‘Productivity gains from unemployment 
insurance’, European Economic Review 44, 1195-1224 
 
Arni P, Lalivea R and Van Ours J (2012) ‘How effective are unemployment benefit 
sanctions?  Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit’, Journal of Applied Econometrics  
 
Attlee C (1937) The Labour Party in Perspective, London, Victor Gollancz 
 
Baumberg B (2014) ‘Fit-for-Work – or Work Fit for Disabled People? The Role of Changing 
Job Demands and Control in Incapacity Claims’, Journal of Social Policy, 43, 2: 289-310 
 
Bryson A and Jacobs J (1992) Policing the Workshy: Benefit controls, the labour market and 
the unemployed, Aldershot, Avebury  
 
Chetty R (2008) ‘Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance’, 
Journal of Political Economy, 116 (2), 173-234 
 
Deacon A (1976) In Search of the Scrounger: The administration of Unemployment 
Insurance in Britain 1920-1931, Occasional Papers on Social Administration No.60, London, 
Social Administration Research Trust, Bell 
 
Fitzpatrick S,  Bramley G, Sosenko F et al. (2016) Destitution in the UK, York, Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 27 April, at https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/destitution-uk 
 
Giles C (2019) ‘Slowing productivity rings alarm bells’, Financial Times, 15 April  
 
Green F, Felstead A, Gallie D et al. (2018) Work Intensity in Britain: First Findings from the 




Hills J (2015) Good Times, Bad Times: The welfare myth of them and us, Bristol, Policy 
Press 
 
Loopstra R, Reeves A, McKee M et al. (2015) Do punitive approaches to unemployment 
benefit recipients increase welfare exit and employment? A cross-area analysis of UK 
sanctioning reforms, Oxford University Department of Sociology, 
Sociology Working Paper No. 2015-01, January, at  
http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/sanction120115-2.pdf  
 
McKay S, Smith A, Youngs R et al. (1999)  Unemployment and jobseeking after the 
introduction of Jobseekers Allowance, DWP Research Report No.99 
 
Manning A (2009) ‘You can't always get what you want: The impact of the UK Jobseeker's 
Allowance’, Labour Economics, 16 (3), 239–250 
 





National Audit Office (2016) Benefit Sanctions, HC 628, 30 November, at 
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/benefit-sanctions/ 
 
Oakley M (2014) Independent review of the operation of Jobseeker’s Allowance sanctions 




Patacchini E and Zenou Y (2006) ‘Search activities, cost of living and 
local labor markets’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36, 227–248 
 
Peters M and Joyce L (2006) A review of the JSA sanctions regime: Summary findings, DWP 
Research Report No. 313 
 
Petrongolo B (2009) ‘The long-term effects of job search requirements: Evidence from the 
UK JSA reform’, Journal of Public Economics, 93 (11–12), 1234–1253 
 
Social Mobility Commission (2019) The adult skills gap: is falling investment in UK 




UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2019) Statement on Visit to 
the United Kingdom, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on 




Van Den Berg G and Vikström J (2014) ‘Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, 
Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 116(2), 
284–334 
 
Waddell G and Aylward M (2005) The Scientific and Conceptual Basis of Incapacity 
Benefits, TSO 
 
Webster D (2005) ‘Long-Term Unemployment, the Invention of “Hysteresis” and the 
Misdiagnosis of Structural Unemployment in the UK’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
Vol.29 No.6, November, pp.975-95   
 
Webster D (2018) ‘The great benefit sanctions drive 2010-16 in historical perspective’, 
presentation to the conference Welfare Conditionality: Principles, Practice and 
Perspectives, University of York, Wednesday 27 June 2018, at 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/183161/ 
 
Webster D (2019) Briefing: Benefit Sanctions Statistics February 2019, 19 March, at 
www.cpag.org.uk/david-webster 
 
                                                          
1 University of Glasgow, Urban Studies 
